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EQUITABLE INTEREST IN ENHANCED EARNING CAPACITY:
THE TREATMENT OF A PROFESSIONAL DEGREE AT
DISSOLUTION-In re Marriage of Washburn, 101 Wn. 2d 168, 677
P.2d 152 (1984).
The question of how to treat a professional degree upon marital dissolu-
tion has produced a passel of conflicting state court opinions.1 The issue
1. Courts have wrestled with the issues of whether a degree is property that can be valued and
distributed, whether the supporting spouse will be compensated for contributions made to the student
spouse's professional education, and what the proper measure of an award for those contributions will
be. Most courts have held that the degree is not property, but have granted restitution to the supporting
spouse.
This Note is not intended to be a compendium of the decisions on this issue. The cases cited in In re
Marriage of Washburn, 101 Wn. 2d 168,677 P.2d 152 (1984), are the leading cases from other states. See
infra note 29 and accompanying text.
For a comprehensive discussion of decisions on point, see Bruch, The Definition and Division of
Marital Property in California: Towards Parity and Simplicity, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 813-18 (1982);
Krauskopf, RecompenseforFinancing Spouse's Education: Legal Protectionfor theMarital Investor in
Human Capital, 28 KAN. L. REv. 379,399-400,402-16 (1980); Moore, Should a ProfessionalDegree
Be Considered a MaritalAsset Upon Divorce?, 15 AKRON L. REV. 543 (1982); Oldham, Book Review,
54 U. COLO. L. REv. 469, 490 n.104 (1983) (reviewing L. WErrzMAN, THE MARRIAGE ComRracr
(1981)). See also Brigner, I Put Him Through School. . . Now He Says We're Finished!, 4 FAM.
ADvoc. 16, 18-19, 43 (Winter 1982); Comment, 'Til Degree Do Us Part: The Community Property
Interest in a ProfessionalDegree, 18 U.S.FL. REV. 275,279-84 (1984); Comment, FamilyLaw: Ought
a Professional Degree Be Divisible as Property upon Divorce?, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 517,524-39
(1981).
For a digest-like treatment, see I. BAXTER, MARITAL PROPERTY §§ 41:3(d),41:7 (Supp. 1984);Family
Law Reporter's 1983 Survey ofAmerican Family Law, 10 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3017, 3032-34 (Jan. 17,
1984); Freed & Foster, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 17 FAM. L.Q. 365,388-400 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Freed & Foster, (1984)]; Freed & Foster, Family Law in the Fifty States: An
Overview, 16 FAM. L.Q. 289, 300-12 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Freed & Foster, (1983)]; Freed &
Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 18 FAM. L.Q. 369, 411-22 (1985); Annot., 4
A.L.R.4th 1294 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
Cases on point that are too recent to have been included in the above materials are Sullivan v. Sullivan,
37 Cal. 3d 762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984) (reversing Sullivan v. Sullivan, 134 Cal. App.
3d 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1982), which was cited by the Washburn court) (compensation for
contributions to spousal education must be given); Weinstein v. Weinstein, 128 11. App. 3d 234, 470
N.E.2d 551 (1984) (degree is relevant factor in distributing assets); McGowan v. McGowan, 663 S.W.2d
219 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983) (lump-sum maintenance awarded); Olah v. Olah, 135 Mich. App. 404, 354
N.W.2d 359 (1984) (degree is not property; lump-sum alimony awarded); Reiss v. Reiss, 195 N.J. Super.
150, 478 A.2d 441 (1984) (reimbursement alimony awarded); Hodge v. Hodge, 11 FAM. L. REP. (BNA)
1096 (Pa. Super. Ct. Nov. 30,1984) (available on LEXIS, States library, Pa. file) (contribution is a factor
to be considered in dividing property or awarding alimony); Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d
250 (S.D. 1984) (reimbursement alimony is optional); Wehrkamp v. Wehrkamp, 357 N.W.2d 264 (S.D.
1984) (degree is not property); In re Marriage of Femau, 39 Wn. App. 695,694 P.2d 1092 (1984) (court
may but is not required to place monetary value on degree; award may be in the form of property,
maintenance, or a combination of both). The Weinstein opinion has a comprehensive status report on the
development of this issue in state courts. A particularly noteworthy recent opinion is Haugan v. Haugan,
117 Wis. 2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796 (1984). The Haugan court discussed a number of approaches to the
professional degree problem, and concluded that several methods of valuation are acceptable.
Eleven states (California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina,
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arises when the degree is acquired through the mutual efforts of the marital
partners, but before the couple realizes the fruits of their labors, the
marriage is dissolved. Typically, the husband leaves with the diploma and
the enhanced earning capacity it provides, while the wife seeks recognition
of her investment of time, money, work and emotion.2
The Washington Supreme Court addressed this problem in In re Mar-
riage of Washburn.3 The court held that a supporting spouse should be
compensated for contributing to the attainment of a student spouse's
degree. The court stated that such a contribution is a factor that trial courts
must consider in dividing property or in awarding maintenance. 4 It also held
that trial courts must consider the future earning prospects of each spouse in
making an award.5 Nonetheless, the court affirmed an award that was
limited to restitution of direct expenditures and opportunity costs. 6 A
vigorous dissent argued that a professional degree is property subject to
distribution, and that the value of the degree is the enhanced earning
capacity of the student spouse. 7
This Note first analyzes the court's opinion and concludes that it fails to
identify clearly the property nature of the supporting spouse's interest, 8
diverges from desirable trends in property law,9 and is contrary to compel-
ling social and economic policy 10 Second, the Note maintains that restitu-
tion is an inadequate remedy; 11 a spouse who provides support during a
period of professional education should have an equitable interest in the
enhanced earning capacity of the student spouse, based on an economic
partnership model of marriage. 12 Although some courts and commentators
Pennsylvania, Vermont, Wisconsin) now have statutes that require a contribution by one spouse to the
education or career potential of the other spouse to be considered as a factor in awarding maintenance
and/or in dividing property. See California Legislation, 10 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1674 (Oct. 16, 1984);
Freed & Foster, (1984), supra, at 399-400; Freed & Foster, (1983), supra, at 311-12.
2. About 70 cases deciding how to treat professional degrees have appeared in reporters or been
described in secondary literature. The author has found only two cases among that group in which a
husband claimed an interest in his wife's professional degree. In each case, the husband was denied relief
on the grounds that he had made no sacrifices during his wife's education that limited his own career
growth. Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250, 262 (S.D. 1984); Griffin v. Griffin, 10 FAM. L.
REP. (BNA) 1091 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Nov. 22,1983). See alsoIn re Marriage ofHall, 103 Wn. 2d 236, 248,
692 P.2d 175, 182 (1984) (husband may not offset his goodwill with future earning potential of salaried
wife). See infra notes 123 & 140.
3. 101 Wn. 2d 168, 677 P.2d 152 (1984).
4. Id. at 170, 178, 677 P.2d at 153, 158.
5. Id. at 180, 677 P.2d at 159.
6. Id. at 172-73, 182-84, 677 P.2d at 155, 160-61.
7. Id. at 184, 190, 677 P.2d at 161, 164 (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
8. See infra notes 40-63 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 77-102 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 103-24 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 125-36 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
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argue that such a solution raises problems of involuntary servitude and
speculation, this Note concludes that such problems are of less importance
than the need to grant an appropriate expectation remedy to the supporting
spouse.13 Finally, the Note proposes a method of valuing the supporting
spouse's interest. 14
I. BACKGROUND TO WASHBURN
In Washburn, the supreme court consolidated two cases for review. 15 The
first case involved the Washburns. Mr. and Ms. Washburn were married in
1971 when both were undergraduate students. In 1974, Mr. Washburn
enrolled in veterinary school. Ms. Washburn worked full-time, while Mr.
Washburn studied and held part-time and summer employment. Mr. Wash-
burn began his veterinary practice in July of 1979, after nearly five years of
training and internships. The couple separated eighteen months later, and
after another six months, a dissolution decree was entered. 16
The second case involved the Gillettes. Mr. and Ms. Gillette were
married in 1968. Six years later, Ms. Gillette agreed to support her husband
while he obtained a veterinary degree. In return, he promised that after he
obtained the degree, she would never have to work again. For the next seven
and one-half years, Ms. Gillette worked full-time, while Mr. Gillette
studied and worked part-time. Ms. Gillette declined offers of job promo-
tions to move with her husband to the location of the graduate school. They
separated in October of 1981, and he completed his education in June of
1982. A decree of dissolution was entered in March of 1983.17
In each case, the trial court held that neither the professional degree nor
the increased earning capacity it brought to the student spouse was prop-
erty. 8 The Washburn trial court denied Ms. Washburn's request for mainte-
nance and did not compensate her for her contributions to the cost of the
education. 19 On the other hand, the Gillette trial court awarded Ms. Gillette
$19,000 as an equitable right to restitution, based on her contributions and
lost opportunities. 20 She also received a maintenance award of one dollar
per year.21
13. See infra notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 143-56 and accompanying text.
15. Washburn, 101 Wn. 2d at 168-70, 677 P.2d at 152-54.
16. Id. at 170-71, 677 P.2d at 154.
17. Id. at 171-72, 677 P.2d at 154; Letter from Timothy Esser, attorney for respondent Gillette, to
author (Nov. 6, 1984) (date of graduation) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
18. 101 Wit 2d at 171, 172, 677 P.2d at 154, 155.
19. Id. at 171, 183, 677 P.2d at 154, 160.
20. Id. at 172-73, 677 P.2d at 155.
21. Id. at 173, 677 P.2d at 155. For a discussion of the significance of the one dollar maintenance
award, see infra notes 49-50, 128 and accompanying text.
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The supreme court reversed the Washburn trial court, and remanded for
consideration of the compensation due Ms. Washburn. 22 The court upheld
Ms. Gillette's $19,000 in restitution as an award that was "in effect
maintenance,"' 23 and then reversed the one dollar per year maintenance
award as unnecessary.24
1I. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
A. The Majority Opinion
The supreme court declined to address the question of whether a profes-
sional degree is property.25 However, it held that a supporting spouse's
contribution to the cost of an education is a factor to be considered in
framing a decree.26 The court stated that an award could be effected under
the state's dissolution statute27 as an equitable property division, as mainte-
nance, or as a combination of both.2 8
In reaching its conclusions, the court considered the approaches adopted
by other courts. 29 It rejected a theory that the student spouse had been
unjustly enriched, maintaining that such a determination would invite the
introduction of evidence as to fault. 30 Instead, the court based its opinion on
the liberal provisions of Washington's dissolution statute. 31 It directed trial
courts to consider the factors listed in the property division and mainte-
nance sections of the dissolution statute, 32 and also to consider the follow-
ing four factors:
(1) the amount of community funds spent on direct educational costs;
(2) the amount the community would have earned had the student spouse
been employed;
(3) educational or career opportunities given up by the supporting spouse:
and
(4) "[t]he future earning prospects of each spouse, including the earning
potential of the student spouse with the professional degree." 33
22. 101 Wn. 2d at 170, 184, 677 P.2d at 153-54, 161.
23. Id. at 170, 182-83, 677 P.2d at 154, 160.
24. Id. at 183, 677 P.2d at 160.
25. Id. at 176, 677 P.2d at 157.
26. Id. at 170, 178, 677 P.2d at 153, 158.
27. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 26.09 (1983).
28. 101 Wn. 2d at 178, 183, 677 P.2d at 158, 161; accordln re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1,
318 N.W.2d 918, 924 (1982).
29. 101 Wn. 2d at 174-76,677 P.2d at 155-56; see also id. at 188-92,677 P.2d at 163-66 (Rosellini,
J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 176, 677 P.2d at 156-57. Since 1973, Washington has been a no-fault divorce jurisdiction.
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.030 (1983).
31. 101 Wn. 2d at 176-78,677 P.2d at 157-58.
32. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.09.080, .090, .170 (1983).
33. 101 Wn. 2d at 179-80, 677 P.2d at 159 (emphasis added).
Vol. 60:431, 1985
The Treatment of a Professional Degree at Dissolution
The court did not provide a precise valuation formula, so as not to encroach
upon the discretion of trial courts.34
B. The Dissent
The dissent contended that the student spouse's enhanced earning capac-
ity is not simply a factor to be considered.35 Rather, it would have charac-
terized the professional degree and the enhanced earning capacity as
property subject to distribution.36 The dissent compared the degree and the
enhanced earning capacity to other intangible and contingent property
rights that courts have found to be divisible upon dissolution, including
goodwill3 7 and unmatured pension and retirement benefits.38 The dissent
generally agreed that trial courts should consider the majority's four factors
but objected that the majority's holding on valuation was limited to reim-
bursement and/or rehabilitation, maintaining that such an award undercom-
pensated the supporting spouse.39
III. CRITIQUE OF THE WASHBURN OPINION
Washington's dissolution act allows spouses to arrange their marital
separation by agreement!n0 Spouses may independently fashion solutions to
meet their particular financial and psychological needs. Thus, the statute
serves judicial economy and enhances citizen autonomy.41 Also, the like-
lihood that the parties will face the trauma of adversary proceedings is
reduced. For these policies to be fulfilled, however, the judiciary must
establish clear and consistent rules that provide potential litigants a reliable
basis for reaching settlements.
The Washburn court did not establish a clear rule. The court's approach to
professional degrees is flawed in two respects. First, the opinion is ambigu-
ous concerning the nature of the supporting spouse's interest;42 it is not
34. Id. at 179, 677 P.2d at 158.
35. Id. at 184, 677 P.2d at 161 (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 184, 190, 677 P.2d at 161, 164.
37. Id. at 186, 677 P.2d at 162.
38. Id. at 187, 677 P.2d at 162.
39. Id. at 184,677 P.2d at 161. The court never stated directly that its holding should be limited in all
cases to reimbursement, and does not foreclose the possibility of an award based on the student's
enhanced earning capacity. The result of the decision, however, was to limit Ms. Gillette's recovery to
reimbursement. See infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
40. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.070 (1983).
41. See Rieke, The Dissolution Act of1973: From Status to Contract?, 49 WASH. L. REv. 375, 378,
393-99 (1974). The state reserves an overview role to protect against unfairness, however. See WASH.
REv. CODE § 26.09.070(3)-(4) (1983).
42. See infra notes 47-63 and accompanying text.
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clearly identified as property or as maintenance. 43 The court should have
identified the interest as a property right. 44 Second, despite its ruling that the
student spouse's earning potential should be considered, the court affirmed
an award to Ms. Gillette that did not consider earning potential, but was
based exclusively on restitution. 45 The award should have reflected the
property produced by the community, that is, the enhanced earning capacity
of the student spouse. Restitution should not be regarded as an appropriate
remedy 46
A. Identification of the Interest
Identification of a dissolution award as property or maintenance has
important analytical and practical implications. 47 The Washburn opinion is
ambiguous concerning the nature of the interest. The court's failure to
identify the interest as property results in a rule that diverges from a line of
Washington cases that have broadened the traditional definition of property.
The holding also fails to take important social and economic policies into
account.
1. The Opinion: Ambiguities
The Gillette trial court stated that its $19,000 award was compelled by an
"equitable right of restitution, somewhat in the nature of a property
right." 48 The trial court combined this property award with a nominal one
dollar maintenance award so that it could maintain jurisdiction over the
maintenance issue. 49 Apparently, the court intended to protect the recovery
against discharge in bankruptcy 50
43. The court stated that it was not "inclined to address at this time the somewhat metaphysical
question of whether a professional degree is 'property.'' Washburn, 101 Wn. 2d at 176, 677 P.2d at 157.
44. See infra notes 64-124 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 130-42 and accompanying text.
47. For a discussion of the differences between property division and maintenance awards, see
generally H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES §§ 14.1-14.12 (1968);
see also infra notes 103-19 and accompanying text.
48. In re Marriage of Gillette, No. 29727, slip op. at 3 (Wash. Super. Ct. Whitman Co. Feb. 25,
1983), affd sub nom. In re Marriage of Washburn, 101 Wn. 2d 168, 677 P.2d 152 (1984); Brief of
Respondent Alice June Gillette at 10, In re Marriage of Washburn, 101 Wn. 2d 168,677 P.2d 152 (1984).
49. Brief of Appellant Jack Eugene Gillette at app. 3 (quoting Conclusion of Law No. 7), In re
Marriage of Washburn, 101 Wn. 2d 168, 677 P.2d 152 (1984); accordIn re Marriage of Horstmann, 263
N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); see infra note 128.
50. Brief of Respondent Alice June Gillette, supra note 48, at 36; cf In re Marriage of Lundberg,
107 Wis. 2d 1, 318 N.W.2d 918, 925 (1982) (Callow, J., dissenting) (if property award is discharged in
bankruptcy, maintenance award may be appropriately adjusted). For a discussion of the effect of
dischargeability of awards in bankruptcy, see infra note 54.
436
Vol. 60:431, 1985
The Treatment of a Professional Degree at Dissolution
While professing to affirm the $19,000 award, the supreme court pro-
foundly altered its legal effect by labeling it maintenance. 51 After making
this change, the court did an analytical about-face and clothed the award
with attributes of property, announcing that it would protect Ms. Gillette's
right to receive full payment by providing that the award should not
terminate upon her remarriage or death.52 The court's description of the
award as a right to receive a sum certain and its protection of the award
against termination would probably cause a federal tax53 or bankruptcy
court54 to identify the award as property, despite the state court's choice
51. See Washburn, 101 Wn. 2d at 170,182-83,677 P.2d at 154,160. The reason the court offered for
this relabeling is that the award was to be paid in installments, and would thus equalize the parties'
standard of living for a limited time. Id. at 182, 677 P.2d at 160. But it is quite common for property
division awards to be paid in installments. E.g., Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 337
N.W.2d 332, 337 (1983); DeRuwe v. DeRuwe, 72 Wn. 2d 404, 409-10, 433 P.2d 209, 212-13 (1967).
52. 101 Wn. 2d at 183, 677 P.2d at 160. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.170 (1983) allows courts to
make such provisions. If the court's goal really was to protect Ms. Gillette's right to full payment, one
wonders why the court did not also provide that the award should not terminate upon Mr. Gillette's
death, which the statute would also have allowed.
53. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 421-422, 98 Stat. 494,793-99 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), reforms tax laws relating to property transfers and alimony.
A new provision, id. § 421(a), 98 Stat. at 793 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 1041), greatly simplifies the
treatment of property transferred incident to a divorce. Upon transfer, neither spouse will recognize gain
or loss or recapture income. The basis of the property transferred is unchanged. The prior rule, under
which the transferor had gain, is no longer valid. See United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962)
(applying invalid rule).
The provisions relating to alimony are considerably more complex. Alimony remains deductible by
the payor, Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 422(b), 98 Stat. at 797 (to be codified at
I.R.C. § 215(a)), and includible in the income of the payee, id. § 422(a), 98 Stat. at 795 (to be codified
at I.R.C. § 71(a)). Under the prior law, periodicity was the test to determine if a payment qualified as
alimony See Hjorth, Tax Consequences of Post-Dissolution Support PaymentArrangements, 51 WASH.
L. REv. 233,237 (1976). That test has been replaced with a new definition of alimony, Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 422(a), 98 Stat. at 795 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)), and
with rules designed to prevent excess front-loading of payments, id., 98 Stat. at 796 (to be codified at
I.R.C. § 71(0).
One of the elements of the new definition of alimony is that no liability for payments accrues after the
death of the payee spouse. Id., 98 Stat. at 795 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(D)). Thus, if a court
orders that a maintenance award will be non-terminable upon the death of the payee spouse, as the
Washburn court did with its "lump-sum maintenance" award to Ms. Gillette, the award will not be
alimony for federal income tax purposes.
For a more complete discussion of the Act, see 1984 U.S. Coo CONG. & AD. NEws 1491; Divorce
Settlements: Taxes and Pensions, 4 A.B.A. SEc. TAX NEWSLETrER I (Fall 1984); Hjorth, Domestic
Relations Tax Reform Act of 1984, Univ. of Wash. C.L.E. Sem. (Sept. 1984) (copy on file with the
Washington Law Review); O'Connell, The DomesticRelations TaxReform Act: How We Got It and What
We Can Do about It, 18 FAM. L.Q. 473 (1985); Sweeney, Highlights ofThe New Tax Act, 70 A.B.A. J.
76, 78-79 (Nov. 1984); Tax Reform '84, 7 FAM. ADVOC. (Fall 1984); Tax Section Seeks Alimony Delay,
10 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1552 (Aug. 14, 1984); Roche, Book Review, 18 FAM. L.Q. 355,358-60 (1984)
(reviewing M. O'CONNELL, DivoRce TAXATION (1982)).
54. A property award is typically viewed as a civil debt and is therefore dischargeable in bankruptcy.
Payments are not dischargeable, on the other hand, if it can be shown that they are intended for
maintenance or support. Melichar v. Ost, 661 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927
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of label.
Examining the four factors the court directed trial courts to consider
reveals further ambiguity concerning the nature of the interest. 55 The first
two factors, which represent direct expenditures or sacrifices of community
funds, clearly have a property nature.56 The third represents career or
educational opportunity costs that in many cases could readily be assigned a
value; thus, it too has a tangible property nature. 57 The court stated that the
fourth factor, the future earning potential of each spouse, was designed to
ensure that trial courts consider the economic condition in which a dissolu-
tion decree leaves the parties when determining property division and
maintenance issues.58 Earning potential, however, is the basic source of
community property during marriage.59 Therefore, the fourth factor also
carries an implicit assumption that the supporting spouse's interest has a
property nature.
(1982); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1982). See generally Hoffman & Murray, Obligations That Cannot Be
Erased, 5 FAM. ADVOC. 18 (Winter 1983); Note, Congressional Intent in Excepting Alimony, Mainte-
nance, and Supportfrom Discharge in Bankruptcy, 21 J. FAM. L. 525 (1983); Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 758
(1960 & Later Case Svc. 1975 & Supp. 1984). An obligation that does not terminate upon a specific date
or event, such as death or remarriage, is more likely to be found to be in the nature of a dischargeable
property settlement, rather than in the nature of support. See Stout v. Prussel, 691 F.2d 859,861 (9th Cir.
1982). Thus, the court's efforts to protect Ms. Gillette's award had the reverse effect of making it more
vulnerable to discharge in bankruptcy.
To date, repayments for loans or contributions to the cost of a bankrupt's education have been held not
to be in the nature of support and have been discharged. See Neugebauer v. Neugebauer, 548 P.2d 1032
(Okla. 1976); In re Hogg, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. RaP. (CCH) 64,418 (Bankr. E.D.
Wis. Oct. 18, 1971). But cf Matter of Lynn, 18 Bankr. 501 (D. Conn. 1982) (in spite of state court's
finding that degree was property, it was not susceptible for conversion into money for distribution to
creditors, and thus not property for purposes of bankruptcy law). Several commentators have advocated
a change in the Bankruptcy Code to prevent discharge of marital property awards, especially when they
are in the nature of compensation for future income sources such as pensions or enhanced earning
capacities. See Branca, Dischargeability of Financial Obligations in Divorce: the Support Obligation
and the Division of Marital Property, 9 FAM. L.Q. 405,432-34 (1975); Bruch, Of Work, Family Wealth,
and Equality, 17 FAM. L.Q. 99,107 & n.28 (1983); Erickson, Spousal Support Toward the Realization of
Educational Goals: How the Law Can Ensure Reciprocity, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 947, 975-81.
55. Washburn, 101 Wn. 2d at 179-80, 677 P.2d at 159; see also supra text accompanying note 33.
56. See Washburn, 101 Wn. 2d at 180, 677 P.2d at 159 (supporting spouse to be awarded up to one-
half his or her interest therein).
57. See id. The value of opportunity costs can be easily assigned where a supporting spouse forgoes
career opportunities such as a raise or a promotion, as Ms. Gillette did. Where educational opportunities
are forgone, a sum representing the projected rehabilitative costs can be awarded. See infra note 123.
This Note does not endorse the use of the court's first three factors in calculating the supporting
spouse's award. The fact that they can be readily assigned values is pointed out merely to demonstrate
that the property nature of the interest is implicit in the court's holding. But see Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91
N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527, 534 (1982) (introducing concept of "reimbursement alimony" for contribu-
tions made to other spouse's professional training).
58. Washburn, 101 Wn. 2d at 180-81, 677 P.2d at 159.
59. Cross, The Community Property Law in Washington, 49 WASH. L. REv. 729, 749 n.86, 768
n.178, 773 (1974). For a discussion of community principles applicable to the professional degree
problem, see infra notes 91-95, 137-42 and accompanying text.
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Even the case cited by the court to support its holding, DeRuwe v.
DeRuwe,60 lends credence to this property interpretation. In that case, a wife
received a property award in recognition of the prospects of future income
from a business that had been developed by the community's efforts. 61
Similarly, courts should base a property award to a supporting spouse on the
prospects of future income from a student spouse's earning capacity that has
been enhanced by the community's efforts.
Moreover, dicta in the Washburn opinion add to the ambiguity. For
example, the court mentioned the supporting spouse's "return on his or her
investment in family prosperity" 62 and discussed the "mutual expectation
that they would both share in the increased earnings."63 Such language
buttresses an argument for a property interest in enhanced earning capacity.
2. Special Concerns: Involuntary Servitude, Death and Disability, and.
Liens on Future Income
Several arguments appear frequently in decisions and commentaries that
take a position against granting a supporting spouse a property award based
on enhanced earning capacity. First, it is argued that since an award of
property is not modifiable, it would subject the student spouse to involun-
tary servitude. Under a maintenance order, in contrast, a student spouse
could seek a modification, if the choice was made to abandon the profession
and the earning capacity was thereby diminished.64
On closer examination, however, the involuntary servitude argument is
less than compelling. A property award does not require that the student
spouse work at a particular job or profession. The student spouse need only
pay the judgment debt. The amount of that debt and the terms on which it is
paid can be keyed to particular career goals and to the environment in which
60. 72 Wn. 2d 404, 433 P.2d 209 (1967). The spouses in DeRuwe owned extensive ranching
operations. Both spouses had worked hard during their 22 years of marriage to develop their properties
into an estate valued at $865,000. Id. at 405, 406 & n.1, 433 P.2d at 210 & n.l, 211. The court was
reluctant to divide the ranch properties, because their continued success depended upon the husband's
continued ownership and management of the properties. Id. at 407,433 P.2d at 211. The court's solution
was to make an "in futuro" award of $100,000 in community property to the wife, to be deferred for a
ten-year period and then paid with interest. Until paid, the award was to be secured by liens or
mortgages. Id. at 409-10,433 P.2d at 212-13. The court also made an award of maintenance, id. at 407,
433 P.2d at 211, a further indication that the "in futuro" award was property.
61. Id. at 406, 409, 433 P.2d at 211, 212.
62. Washburn, 101 Wn. 2d at 181, 677 P.2d at 159.
63. Id. at 182, 677 P.2d at 160; see also id. at 173, 677 P.2d at 155.
64. Id. at 179 n.3, 677 P.2d 158 n.3. However, when the earning capacity of a payor spouse is
curtailed voluntarily, the Washington courts will not grant a reduction of the maintenance obligation,
absent a substantial showing of good faith. Carstens v. Carstens, 10 Wn. App. 964, 967-68, 521 P.2d
241, 243 (1974).
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which they are pursued. 65 Additionally, the involuntary servitude argument
is not convincing where the student spouse has established an earnings
history at the time of trial, as was the case in both Gillette and Washburn .66
A second argument raised is that an award based on enhanced earning
capacity is speculative, because the professional may encounter a lack of
market opportunities, become disabled, or suffer an untimely death.67 It is
pointed out that whereas maintenance typically terminates upon the death
of the payor, a judgment to pay a property debt might encumber the student
spouse's estate, robbing a later-formed family of an inheritance they might
otherwise expect.68
However, market trends and risks of disability or death can be taken into
account by experts qualified to make economic projections of future
income.69 Also, many professionals carry disability and life insurance that
would be adequate to cover a loss of income due to injury or death.70 As to
the inheritance rights of a second family, the second spouse presumably
would know, when making the choice to many, of any outstanding debts to
the first spouse. Moreover, unless the debt were secured by a lien, 71 a family
allowance and an award in lieu of homestead to the second spouse would be
exempt from the first spouse's claim. 72 In any case, the slight chance of
disability or death should not outweigh the rights of the supporting spouse.
Finally, it is argued that labeling enhanced earning capacity as property
and assigning it a value for purposes of distribution is equivalent to placing
an improper lien on future income.73 This concern becomes irrelevant,
65. See Peck & Hopkins, Economics and Impaired Earning Capacity in Personal Injury Cases, 44
WASH. L. REv. 351, 355-56, 358 (1969); Rosen & Burke, Putting a Value on a Professional License. 7
FAM. ADvoc. 23, 25 (Summer 1984); infra note 148 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text; infra note 147 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796, 803 (1984).
68. Brief of Appellant Jack Eugene Gillette, supra note 49, at 27.
69. See Fitzpatrick & Doucette, Can the Economic Value of an Education Really Be Measured? A
Guidefor Marital Property Dissolution, 21 J. FAM. L. 511, 517 (1983); Peck & Hopkins, supra note 65,
at 355-56, 358; Rosen & Burke, supra note 65, at 24-25; infra note 148 and accompanying text.
70. In fact, it would be preferable for a court to order the purchase of such a policy to protect the
award. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
71. See Swanson v. Graham, 27 Wn. 2d 590, 597-99, 179 P.2d 288,292-93 (1947) (unless decree
for alimony fastens lien on particular property, or orders a lump-sum payment, it creates no lien upon
payor's real property); Kinne v. Kinne, 27 Wn. App. 158, 161-62, 617 P.2d 442, 444 (1980) (applying
Swanson v. Graham criteria to property division payments), review denied, 95 Wn. 2d 1001 (1981):
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.56.190, .200 (1983) (creation of judgment liens).
72. Kinnev. Kinne, 27 Wn. App. 158,161,617 P.2d 442,444-45 (1980), review denied, 95 Wn. 2d
1001 (1981).
73. See Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis.
2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Ct. App. 1980) (superceded by statute as stated in In re Marriage of
Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318 N.W.2d 918, 922 (1982)); cf Dakin v. Dakin, 62 Wn. 2d 687, 692, 384
P.2d 639, 642 (1963) (same concern when issue is maintenance; wife not entitled to maintenance
beyond that required for her to become self-supporting; she is not entitled to perpetual lien on husband's
future income) (quoting Morgan v. Morgan, 59 Wn. 2d 639, 642, 369 P.2d 516, 518 (1962)).
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however, when one recognizes that the student spouse's earning capacity is
not identical to that spouse's future income. Earning capacity is a distinct
property that has the potential of producing future income.74 Courts rou-
tinely apportion many other types of income-producing property.75 Thus,
there is no analytical justification for denying a community interest in
earning capacity, when the interest is limited to that portion of the earning
capacity that is directly attributable to contributions and efforts made
during the marriage.76
3. The New Property
Increasingly, employment and work-related benefits are being identified
as the principal forms of wealth in post-industrial society.77 Courts in other
74. Cf Robinson v. Robinson, 355 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (future earning capacity of
small business is separable from owner's salary); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d 233,452 N.Y.S.2d
801, 805 (1982) (spouse's interest in economic fruits of degree is analogous to interest in future income
from a business); In re Marriage of Freedman, 35 Wn. App. 49, 52, 665 P.2d 902, 905 (award of
goodwill is not award of wages earned after the marriage, even though the value of the goodwill may be
determined by the income of the professional spouse), review denied, 100 Wn. 2d 1019 (1983).
75. See, e.g., Wilder v. Wilder, 85 Wn. 2d 364, 534 P.2d 1355 (1975) (pension); DeRuwe v.
DeRuwe, 72 Wn. 2d 404, 409, 433 P.2d 209, 212 (1967) (ranching business); Ross v. Narson, 31 Wn.
App. 609, 643 P.2d 928 (1982) (disability insurance benefits); In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wn. App.
481, 558 P.2d 279 (1976) (goodwill), review denied, 88 Wi. 2d 1011 (1977); accord Robinson v.
Robinson, 355 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (marital interest in small business property may be
valued by a capitalization of future earning capacity that arises from ownership). See generally I.
BAXTER, MARrAL PROPEmy § 41:7(a), at 181-82 (Supp. 1984) (when distributing income-producing
property, many courts have held that maintenance is not an adequate substitute for a property award;
frequent solution is to award money payable in installments in the future).
76. See infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
77. M. GLENDON, TrENEw FAMILYANDTHENEw PRoPERrY3,169-76, 185-205 (1981); Reich, The
New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 739 (1964); Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and
Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1181,
1192, 1264 (1981).
During Washington's 1984 legislative session, Representative Joe Tanner made a proposal to amend
the definitional section of the community property statute, WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.030 (1983). He
proposed that the following language be inserted into the statute:
Community property includes career assets of the marital partnership. Career assets consist of the
future value attached to professional licenses earned by either spouse or both spouses during the
marriage and the value of a professional education attained by either spouse or both spouses during
the marriage.
Letter from Representative Joe Tanner to House Democratic Caucus (Oct. 28, 1983), discussed in 2
WASH. FAM. L. REP. 1, 1-2 (Jan. 1984). The proposal did not result in the filing of a bill, but
Representative Tanner plans to continue to work on the issue in upcoming legislative sessions.
Telephone interview with Representative Joe Tanner (Nov. 8, 1984) (notes on file with the Washington
Law Review).
The above proposal suffers from over-specificity in the definition of career assets. Also, the necessity
for its inclusion in the community property statute is questionable, since the statute currently has a
"catch-all" definition of community property as any property acquired after marriage that is not
separate. See WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.030 (1983). Nonetheless, the proposal is commendable for its
recognition of work-related assets as important forms of wealth in today's society. See also Bruch, supra
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jurisdictions have held that career assets such as a law practice, 78 an
accounting practice,79 partnership interests,8° and employee stock options8'
are property subject to distribution. The United States Supreme Court has
also acknowledged the existence of the new property. The Court has found a
property interest for due process purposes in public education 82 as well as in
a number of work-related new forms of wealth, 83 including wages, 84 wel-
fare benefits, 85 Social Security disability payments, 86 and government
employment. 87
In keeping with this legal and sociological evolution of new forms of
property, the Washington courts have held that career assets such as good-
will 88 and pension benefits 89 are property. In Washburn the Washington
note 1, at 820 & n. 199 (quoting proposed amendment which would include enhanced earning capacity in
definitional section of California's community property statute).
Of the eleven states that have statutes relating to the treatment of professional degrees in dissolution
proceedings, see supra note 1, none expressly approves valuation of the enhanced earning capacity of
the student spouse. For example, recovery to a supporting spouse under Indiana's statute is incredibly
restrictive, limiting the award to reimbursement for contributions to "tuition, books and laboratory
fees." See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11(c) (Bums Supp. 1984).
It is possible, however, that many of the other statutes could be interpreted to allow valuation of the
enhanced earning capacity. Wisconsin's statute, for example, can be interpreted to indicate compensa-
tion in the future. See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 767.255, .26 (West 1981 & Supp. 1984-85); Krauskopf,
supra note 1, at 403. The Wisconsin courts have not granted, in any reported decision, an award based on
a present value capitalization of enhanced earning capacity, although in the most recent decision from
that jurisdiction the court stated that such a calculation is an acceptable method of valuation. Haugan v.
Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796, 803 (1984).
These inadequate legislative provisions bring into question whether the legislative branch can
effectively protect the supporting spouse's interest in this "new property." The decisionmaking process
in the legislative setting consists of compromise and negotiation. That process is a good one when all
points of view are fairly represented. It seems preferable, however, that a remedy for a supporting spouse
be formulated in the courts. In ajudicial setting, individual circumstances can be taken into account, and
the decisionmaker is not faced with the well-organized lobbies of professional associations whose
members are vitally affected by such laws. See Peck, Comments on Judicial Creativity, 69 IowA L. REV.
1, 1-11, 40-42 (1983).
78. Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 135 (1969); Litman v. Litman, 61
N.Y.2d 918, 463 N.E.2d 34 (1984).
79. Heller v. Heller, 672 S.W.2d 945 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
80. Balogh v. Balogh, 356 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (law firm partnership).
81. Callahan v. Callahan, 142 N.J. Super. 325, 361 A.2d 561 (1976).
82. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); accord Crook v. Baker, 584 F. Supp. 1531 (E.D. Mich.
1984) (property interest exists in advanced degree, which state university may not rescind without first
affording due process to degree holder).
83. See generally M. GLENDON, supra note 77, at 92 & n.161, 187-90.
84. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
85. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
86. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
87. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
88. See In re Marriage of Hall, 101 Wn. 2d 236, 692 P.2d 175 (1984) (physician in private practice
has goodwill but salaried professor does not); In re Marriage of Fleege, 91 Wn. 2d 324, 588 P.2d 1136
(1979) (dentist in private practice); In re Marriage of Freedman, 35 Wn. App. 49,665 P.2d 902 (attorney
in private practice), review denied, 100 Wn. 2d 1019 (1983); In re Marriage of Campbell, 22 Wn. App.
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Supreme Court diverged from this trend. The court should have recognized
the professional degree and its accompanying enhanced earning capacity as
a new form of property.90
Community property principles also support a property label. Under
Washington's community property law, community property is property that
is acquired through the labor or industry of either spouse,91 or for other
valuable consideration. Thus, except for gifts to the community, community
property is property that is acquired onerously 92 The character of an asset
becomes fixed at the time of its acquisition; assets acquired during the
marriage are presumed to be community property.93 Thus, where a profes-
sional degree is onerously acquired during the marriage, it should be
identified as property with a community character.
560, 589 P.2d 1244 (1978) (sales representative); In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wn. App. 481,558 P.2d
279 (1976) (physician in private practice), review denied, 88 Wn. 2d 1011 (1977); see alsoIn re Marriage
of Kaplan, 23 Wn. App. 503, 597 P.2d 439 (1979) (existence of goodwill is a question of fact).
89. See, e.g., Wilder v. Wilder, 85 Wn. 2d 364, 534 P.2d 1355 (1975); Payne v. Payne, 82 Wn. 2d
573, 512 P.2d 736 (1973), DeRevere v. DeRevere, 5 Wn. App. 741, 746, 491 P.2d 249, 252 (1971).
The United States Supreme Court has held that a supremacy clause conflict existed with regard to
certain pensions regulated by federal statute. See McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981) (federal law
precludes courts in community property states from treating military retirement pay as divisible
community property); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979) (Railroad Retirement Act
precludes courts in community property states from treating retirement benefits under the Act as
divisible community property). See generally Schwartz & McClure, Division of Federal Pension
Benefits, 11 COMM. PRop. J. 165 (1984).
Congress responded to McCarty in 1982, however, with the Uniformed Services Former Spouses'
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, §§ 1001-1006, 96 Stat. 730, 730-38 (1982) (codified in scattered
sections of 10 U.S.C.). The Act provided that subject to certain limitations, military pensions may be
considered divisible community property. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (c)(l) (1982). The Washington court then
revived its former position that such retirement benefits are a form of divisible property. In re Marriage of
Smith, 100 Wn. 2d 319, 669 P.2d 448 (1983) (abandoning the holding in In re Marriage of Dessauer, 97
Wn. 2d 831, 839, 650 P.2d 1099, 1103 (1982), that after McCarty a military pension could neither be
characterized as community property for division nor valued to offset property against value).
In August of 1983, Congress enacted similar amendments allowing states to treat a portion of railroad
workers' pensions as divisible community property. That portion that is equivalent to the amount the
worker would have received under Social Security if railroad service qualified as employment under the
Social Security Act is not divisible, however. Railroad Retirement Solvency Act of 1983, Pub. L. No.
98-76, § 419(a), (b), 97 Stat. 411,438 (tobecodified at45 U.S.C. § 231m(b)(2)). Also, former spouses
may qualify as independent beneficiaries under certain circumstances. 45 U.S.C.A. § 231a(c)(4) (West
Supp. 1984) (divorced wife); 45 U.S.C.A. § 231a(d)(1)(v) (West Supp. 1984) (surviving divorced
wife). But cf In re Marriage of Roark, 34 Wn. App. 252, 659 P.2d 1133 (1983) (railroad retirement
benefits can properly be considered as one of the economic circumstances of the parties in making an
equitable property division, but are not divisible community property). Roark was decided in March of
1983, before the above legislation was enacted. Presumably, if the court faced the issue again, it would
abandon the holding in Roark, as the similar holding in Dessauer was abandoned.
90. See Washburn, 101 Wn. 2d at 185-87, 677 P.2d at 162 (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
91. In re Marriage of Brown, 100 Wn. 2d 729, 737, 675 P.2d 1207, 1212 (1984).
92. Id. at 735, 737-38, 675 P.2d at 1211, 1212 (citing W. DE FUtNAK & M. VAUGHN, PRiNCIPLES OF
COMMUNrrY PRoPEmr, § 82, at 201 (2d ed. 1971)); Cross, supra note 59, at 746 & i.74.
93. Stokes v. McDowell, 70 Wn. 2d 694, 424 P.2d 910 (1967); Cross, supra note 59, at 746-47
(citing Yesler v. Hochstettler, 4 Wash. 349, 30 P. 398 (1892)).
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Neither a professional degree nor the enhanced earning capacity associ-
ated with it, of course, is actually possible to divide. Both will remain with
the student spouse. Nonetheless, earning capacity is the basic community
asset; more precisely, it is the source that produces community property.94
As such, the enhanced earning capacity acquired during the marriage is the
proper measure of a property award to a supporting spouse.95
94. Cross, supra note 59, at 749 n.86, 768 n.178, 773.
95. See In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Iowa 1978) (degree is not divisible, but
enhanced earning capacity is asset for equitable distribution); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d 233,
452 N.Y.S.2d 801, 805 (1982) (license is personal, but its economic fruits are subject to transfer under
equitable distribution law).
Some would point out that earning capacity is separate property after the marriage ends. An
illustrative case is In re Marriage of Brown, 100 Wn. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984). Brown refined the
former Washington rule that personal injury damage awards, including those for an injury to one
spouses's earning capacity, are community property. See id. at 731-34, 675 P.2d at 1209-10. The court
held that awards received due to a tortious injury to one spouse's earning capacity that occurs during
marriage are community property during marriage, but become the separate property of the injured
spouse upon separation or dissolution. Id. at 738-39, 675 P.2d at 1212-13. By analogy, one could argue
that income received due to an enhancement of earning capacity that occurs during marriage would be
community property during marriage, but would become the separate property of the "enhanced"
spouse upon dissolution.
The key to the Brown holding, however, is that compensation for personal injury is not acquisition by
onerous title. Id. at 736-37, 675 P.2d at 1211-12. Rather, it is a "fortuitous acquisition." Id. at 734,739,
675 P.2d at 1210, 1213 (quoting but disapproving the result in In re Marriage of Parsons, 28 Wn. App.
276, 278, 622 P.2d 415, 416, review denied, 95 Wn. 2d 1019 (1981)). Thus, the onerous acquisition of a
professional education is distinguishable.
Furthermore, the Brown court recognized that earning capacity is property, and that its character is
community during the marriage. Id. at 738, 675 P.2d at 1212. The award proposed in this Note is not an
award of post-marital earnings per se, although those earnings may determine the value of the award.
Rather, it is an award in recognition of the enhancement to the earning capacity that occurred when the
earning capacity was a community asset. For a discussion of the question of putting a lien on future
earnings, see supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
Finally, even if a court made the less desirable characterization of the enhanced earning capacity as
separate, a similar result would be reached under an equitable lien theory. The lien would arise because
community funds and labor would have improved the separate property of the student spouse. The
supporting spouse may have to rebut a presumption of gift, which should not be difficult since it would
be clear that the supporting spouse was making an investment with an expectation of future benefit. See
Cross, supra note 59, at 778 & n.224 (where community's contribution can be reasonably viewed as a
business investment, it is unlikely to be found to be a gift). For a discussion of how the conduct of the
spouses evidences their mutual intent to make an investment, see infra notes 133-42 and accompanying
text.
The measure of the community's interest should be the increased value of the earning capacity, and
should not be limited by the amount of the community funds advanced. See Baker v. Baker, 80 Wn. 2d
736, 745, 498 P.2d 315, 321 (1972) (investment of community funds and labor to improve separate
property gives rise to equitable lien for increase in value); Bartke, Yours, Mine and Ours-Separate Title
and Community Funds, 44 WASH. L. REv. 379, 389, 393-94, 400-01, 419 (1969) (court should treat
expenditures as an equity investment of community funds, and award a fair share of resulting gain that is
not limited to reimbursement of the capital funds, especially where the improved property results in no
income to the community); Cross, supra note 59, at 780 (where community funds are spent by one
spouse to improve other spouse's separate property, the increased value of the separate property should
be the measure of recovery). But cf Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107, 109 (Tex. 1984) (community is
entitled to reimbursement for reasonable value of time and effort expended by either or both spouses to
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Not all improvements in earning capacity that occur during marriage,
however, should be characterized as community property and evaluated
upon dissolution. For example, in In re Marriage of Hall,96 the spouses
married while both were medical students. They attained their medical
doctorates in the same year; apparently, neither postponed training on
behalf of the other. The husband went into private practice and enjoyed a
good reputation as a consultant; the wife pursued an academic career,
published widely, and became known as one of the top ten authorities in the
nation in her field. At the time of their dissolution, each had been out of
school well over a decade.97 When the trial court found that the husband had
goodwill but that the wife, being salaried, did not, the husband appealed.98
One of his contentions was that his wife's future earning potential was an
asset that should offset his goodwill.99
The Hall court declined to find, on those facts, that future earning
potential was an asset that could be used to offset goodwill. The court did,
however, cite to Washburn while emphasizing the importance of future
earning potential, and found that it was a substantial factor to be considered
in making a just and equitable property division. 10
If the husband in Hall made sacrifices to further his wife's earning
potential, those sacrifices were undoubtedly reciprocated by his wife.
Additionally, he had already benefited, over the years, from any sacrifices
made to further her career. Based on those facts, the supreme court properly
declined to treat the wife's future earning capacity as a marital asset.
Mechanisms already exist in the Washington dissolution act to reach a just
and equitable result in such cases. 101 But in cases such as Washburn, where
the community expends funds or labor to enhance the earning capacity of
only one spouse, or where one spouse's earning capacity will be suddenly
and substantially enhanced after the marriage due to efforts made during the
marriage, it becomes important to evaluate the enhanced earning capacity
as property in which a community interest exists. 102
increase the value of either spouse's separate property). See generally Comment, Serving Two Masters:
Expenditure of Community Labor and Assets on Separate Property in Washington, 19 GONZ. L. REv.
519 (1984).
96. 103 Wn. 2d 236, 692 P.2d 175 (1984).
97. Id. at 237-38, 692 P.2d at 176.
98. Id. at 238, 692 P.2d at 176-77.
99. Id. at 247, 692 P.2d at 181.
100. Id. at 247-48, 692 P.2d at 181-82.
101. Id. The statute requires that in dividing property a court shall consider the economic
circumstances of each spouse. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.080(4) (1983).
102. Another example is instructive. Consider an apprentice carpenter who becomes a master while
remaining continuously employed. The position is acquired at no-costto the community, and it is likely
that the master carpenter's spouse will already have-beni-fited from the gradually enhanced earning
capacity during the marriage. As in Hall, there is no need to characterize the carpenter's enhanced
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4. Policy Considerations
For psychological, social, and economic reasons, a division of property
that is based on the professional's enhanced earning capacity is preferable to
a maintenance award. First, there are psychological costs associated with
maintenance. Maintenance does not reflect the equitable positions of the
parties relative to each other. 103 On the contrary, a belief that one spouse
depends on the other for support has traditionally been implicit in the
award. 104 Thus, it very often places the recipient spouse in a subservient
position psychologically 105
Anger, disappointment, or resentment might motivate a payor spouse to
delay payment under a maintenance order. 106 Such feelings may also serve
as disincentives to the payor to work at full potential, in order to avoid
precipitating an upward modification of the award. 107 Moreover, ineffective
enforcement and the potential for downward modification can have devas-
tating effects on the recipient spouse's financial security, which, in turn,
may wreak havoc on that spouse's emotional well-being. 08 Such con-
earning capacity as community property. See Comment, 'Til Degree Do Us Part, supra note 1, at 291
n.86. But cf Weitzman, supra note 77, at 1220 (apprenticeship, union membership, on-the-job training,
work experience, job security and seniority rights are career assets that should be identified as
community property); Comment, A Property Theory of Future Earning Potential in Dissolution
Proceedings, 56 WASH. L. REV. 277, 284-85 (1981) (advocating adoption of a general property theory
of future earning potential).
103. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.090(1) (1983) (court may grant maintenance in such
amounts and for such periods as it deems just) with WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080 (1983) (court shall
make such disposition of the property as shall appear just and equitable).
104. See Kelso v. Kelso, 75 Wn. 2d 24, 448 P.2d 499 (1968). Under the provisions of the 1973
statute, need is not an essential criterion in awarding maintenance, but it underlies at least three of the six
factors the trial court is to consider. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.090 (1)(a), (b), (e) (1983).
105. D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY 73 (1979) ("The man who used his wife's access to
money during marriage as a way of keeping her servile and dependent may maintain this pattern after
divorce. . . . Unpredictability in payments induces anxiety in the woman and is thus a source of power
for the male, assuring him at once of her dependence on him and her comparative lesser worth."); Nagel
& Weitzman, Women as Litigants, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 189 (requesting support payments can be
degrading paternalistic procedure even when support is considered income accrued as a result of
inadequately compensated wifehood and payment for obtaining rehabilitative education or training).
Some of these feelings are evident in the briefing on behalf of Ms. Washburn. See Reply Brief of
Appellant Marigail Washburn at 17, In re Marriage of Washburn, 101 Wn. 2d 168, 677 P.2d 152 (1984)
("An award of maintenance ... does not address the issue of her contribution and sacrifice...
Marigail is not looking for help from Jerry. She is entitled to a property award . ) (emphasis
added).
106. D. CHAMBERS, supra note 105, at 73-75; Eckman, Child Support? Forget It, WORKING
McrrHER 63, 95-96 (Feb. 1983).
107. In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 892 (Iowa 1978) (husband complains that
potential for increase in maintenance from nominal one dollar per year will loom over him and may deter
him from certain undertakings).
108. See Colletta, Stressful Lives: The Situation of Divorced Mothers and Their Children, 6 J. OF
DIVORCE 19 (1983); Weitzman, supra note 77, at 1225-32, 1252 & nn.228-31, 1253-60. See also
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sequences should be avoided, particularly where the recipient has an
interest in the subject asset, the professional degree, as a matter of right.
In contrast, a property division has the psychological advantage of
closure. Though there may be installment payments to make, it is a clean
break in the sense that both parties know their financial positions. A sum
certain is due, and there is no concern about modification.
Another policy concern is that social and economic displacement costs
are likely to be higher under a maintenance order than under a judgment
that properly identifies and divides all of the marital property. A number of
studies have shown that after divorce, men generally are more financially
secure than women. 109 For instance, Weitzman's 1978 study in Los Angeles
County revealed the striking fact that within the first year after divorce, men
experienced a forty-two percent improvement in their standard of living
while women experienced: a seventy-three percent loss."10 Major factors
contributing to this disparity are inadequate spousal support awards and
ineffective enforcement of awards. 11
This disparity is likely to be more acute for long-term homemakers or
young mothers with no work experience than it is for women who have
successfully supported a husband through professional school. The latter
group, however, will also be affected by these economic realities. Many of
Eckman, supra note 106, at 93-94 (difficulties in securing credit and making long-range plans due to
noncompliance by fathers with child support orders). The enforcement problems for child support are
analogous to those for spousal support.
109. See, e.g., D. CHAMBERS, supra note 105, at 42-50; Albrecht, Reactions and Adjustments to
Divorce: Differences in the Experiences of Males and Females, 29 FAM. RELATIONS 59, 63 table 2,
65-67 (1980); Hoffman & Holmes, Husbands, Wives, and Divorce, in 4 FIvE THOUSAND AMERICAN
FAMLmES-PATrERNS OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS 23 (G. Duncan & . Morgan eds. 1976); Weitzman, supra
note 77, at 1241-53; see also Hunter, Child SupportLaw and Policy: The Systematic Imposition of Costs
on Women, 6 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 19-21 (1983); Schulman, Poor Women and Family Law, 14
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1069 (1981).
110. Weitzman, supra note 77, at 1251.
111. Maintenance is awarded in only 14.9% of all cases. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-23, No. 124, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1981
(ADVANCE REPORT) 2 table A (1983). Of those women awarded maintenance, only 43.5% received full
payment; 32.6% received no payments. Id. The mean amount received in 1981 was $3,000. Id. at 2. See
also Albrecht, supra note 109, at 65-66; Weitzman, supra note 77, at 1253-56.
Another reason for the post-divorce wealth disparity is the "discounted 'woman's wage,"' Hunter,
supra note 109, at 21, which has been most recently reported to be at 64 cents to every dollar earned by
men. Narrowing the Wage Gap, TIM 41, col. I (Nov. 12, 1984). See generally M. GLNIDON, supra note
77, at 51, 130-32, 192-95. Also crucial is the fact that women generally are awarded custody of minor
children; thus, their support obligations increase while men's decreases. Child support awards, notori-
ously inadequate and difficult to enforce, do little to ameliorate the woman's dilemma. See generally
Hunter, supra note 109; Krause, Reflections on Child Support, 17 FAM. L.Q. 109 (1983). Much has been
written documenting the woman's journey from divorce to poverty and welfare. See, e.g., McDonald &
Diehl, Women and Welfare, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1036 (1981); Pearce, The Feminization of Poverty:
Women, Work and Welfare, 11 URB. & Soc. CH. REv. 28 (1978); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 98TH CONG., IsT SEss., BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON POVEmRY XII, XIV-XV, 51-59, 61-62,
77-90, 130-40 (Comm. Print 1983).
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them are likely to be supporting young children, particularly if the divorce
occurred within a few years after the husband began his career. 112
An award properly based on the supporting spouse's expectation of a fair
return on the investment in the jointly acquired professional degree will
alleviate some of the burdens on families and the social welfare system. 113
There must be a recognition of the social upheaval and economic injustice
that results from a failure to identify and distribute equitably all of the
family assets in a dissolution proceeding.
A final policy consideration is that identifying the supporting spouse's
award as property will reduce judicial and administrative costs. A division
of property is resolved within the divorce proceeding. It is a judgment like
any other, that may not be revoked or modified unless grounds for recon-
sideration or a new trial are shown within the appropriate statutory time
limits. 114 Enforcement may be had by writ of execution on real or personal
property. 115
In contrast, under a maintenance order, the potential exists for further
hearings on a motion for modification 16 or to collect delinquent pay-
ments. 117 Also, if support enforcement fails, the government must bear the
costs of aid to families in need." 8 These problems are exacerbated by the
high divorce rate. 119 Judicial and administrative efficiency are better served
by the finality of a division of property.
5. Summary
The trial judge needs to know what constitutes property available for
distribution. 120 After identifying all the property, the trial court must deter-
112. Ms. Washburn, for example, is the mother of a child born in April of 1979, nearly a year after
Mr. Washburn's graduation in June of 1978. The child was two years old when the decree of dissolution
was entered on June 2, 1981. See Washburn, 101 Wn. 2d at 171, 677 P.2d at 154. Custody is with the
mother. Decree of Custody, Visitation, Child Support and Property Division at 2, In re Marriage of
Washburn, No. 81-3-00368-2 (Wash. Super. Ct. Snohomish Co. March 2, 1981).
113. Fain, The Effect of Property Distribution on Alimony Awards in a Community Property
Jurisdiction (California), in ECONOMICS OF DIVORCE, 1978 A.B.A. FAM. L. SEC. INsT. 35, 67.
114. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.170 (1983); id. ch. 4.72, .76 (1983 & Supp. 1984).
115. Id. §§ 6.04.010, .020, .030 (1983).
116. Id. § 26.09.170 (1983).
117. Id. ch. 26.21 (1983).
118. See Foster, Alimony Awards, in ECONOMICS OF DIVORCE, 1978 A.B.A. FAM. L. SEC. INST. 1.
13-14; Krause, supra note 111, at 109.
119. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
ADVANCE REPoRT OF FINAL DIVORCE STATISTICS, 1981, 32 MONTHLY Vrr. STATISTICS REP. 1 (Jan. 17,
1984).
120. Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Luvem V. Rieke at 22, In re Marriage of Hall. 103 Wn. 2d
236, 692 P.2d 175 (1984) (existence and valuation of professional goodwill).
An excellent example of the confusion that can result from an ambiguous identification of a
dissolution award is the controversy resulting from In re Marriage of Freedman, 35 Wn. App. 49, 665
P.2d 902, review denied, 100 Wn. 2d 1019 (1983). In Freedman, the court of appeals upheld a trial
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mine the character of the property as community or separate. 121 Then, the
court can place a value on the property and exercise its discretion to make a
fair and equitable distribution. 122
When a court applies this process in the professional degree context, it is
preferable that it identify the supporting spouse's interest as property rather
than grant maintenance. 123 Where spouses have jointly invested time,
court's creation of an award labeled spouse's economic benefit expectancy ("SEBE") to compensate a
wife for her interest in the goodwill of her husband's law practice. The court held that there was "no
magic" in the label applied to the award. 35 Wn. App. at 51, 665 P.2d at 904; see also In re Marriage of
Hadley, 88 Wn. 2d 649, 658, 565 P.2d 790, 795 (1977) (label applied to the award is not controlling;
ultimate question is whether result is just and equitable), cited with approval in Washburn, 101 Wn. 2d at
182, 677 P.2d at 160. Since Freedman, the SEBE doctrine has been raised in at least two appeals of
dissolution cases involving professional goodwill SeeIn re Marriage of Hall, 103 Wn. 2d 236,240,692
P.2d 175,177 (1984); In re Marriage of Carlton, No. 82-3-01132-6, slip op. at 2 (Wash. Super. Ct. Kitsap
Co. Apr. 16, 1984), appeal docketed, No. 78-11-2-11 (Wash. Ct. App. May 11, 1984). The fallout of
Freedman is also discernible in the failure of the Washburn court to establish clear guidelines as to the
identification of the supporting spouse's award. Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Luvern V. Rieke,
supra, at 12.
The problem in these cases is that the federal and state family law system is premised on the
identification of dissolution awards as maintenance or property. Practitioners and litigants need to know
whether an award is maintenance or property, so that they will know how it is to be enforced or taxed, or
if it can be terminated, modified, or discharged in bankruptcy. See Inker, Walsh & Perocchi, Alimony
andAssignment of Property: The New Statutory Scheme in Massachusetts, 11 FAM. L.Q. 59, 69 (1977).
Divorce reform has not yet reached the stage of a unified "post-marital transfer payment," although that
may be in the future. See H. KRAusn, FAMILY LAW IN A NuTsHELL §§ 30.1, 31.1-.2 (1977). For further
illustration of property/maintenance ambiguity problems, see Kinne v. Kinne, 82 Wn. 2d 360, 510 P.2d
814 (1973); Thompson v. Thompson, 82 Wn. 2d 352, 510 P.2d 827 (1973); Wagner v. Wagner, 25 Wn.
App. 439, 607 P.2d 1251, rev'd, 95 Wn. 2d 94, 621 P.2d 1279 (1980).
121. See In re Marriage of Brossman, 32 Wn. App. 851, 858, 650 P.2d 246, 250 (1982) (Durham,
A.C.J., dissenting) (citing Blood v. Blood, 69 Wn. 2d 680, 682, 419 P.2d 1006, 1008 (1966); In re
Marriage of Martin, 22 Wn. App. 295, 297, 588 P.2d 1235, 1236 (1979)). But cf In re Marriage of
Hadley, 88 Wn. 2d 649, 656, 565 P.2d 790, 794 (1977) (court must have in mind the character of
property as community or separate, by tracing source and evolution of assets, but need not list with
particularity in the findings the character of each asset).
122. In Washington, it is left to the discretion of the trial judge to determine how property is to be
equitably divided, after its character and value have been ascertained. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.080
(1983). However, some case law suggests that where property is found to have a community character, a
trial court may not award less than one-third of the value of the property to either spouse, in the absence
of significant statutory factors or equities. In re Marriage of Dessauer, 97 Wn. 2d 831,835, 838-39,650
P.2d 1099, 1100-03 (1982) (affirming award of 75% of value of community property to wife, where her
earning capacity was limited due to her health, age, and sex), overruled on different grounds, as
discussed supra note 89; Rehak v. Rehak, I Wn. App. 963, 966, 465 P.2d 687, 689 (1970) (affirming
award of virtually all of community property to wife, where husband had significant separate property);
see also In re Marriage of Donovan, 25 Wn. App. 691,696,612 P.2d 387,390 (1980) (affirming award to
wife that was twice as great as award to husband, where difference in future earning potential was
significant).
123. Because maintenance awards are granted much more often to wives than to husbands, it is
possible that labeling the award maintenance would unfairly discourage a husband who supported his
wife during her professional education from claiming any compensation. This may partially explain
why so few husbands have pursued such an award. See supra note 2; see also infra note 140.
In Washington, property awards are generally favored over maintenance. Like many other states,
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funds, or labor into the acquisition of a professional degree, the court then
should characterize the property as community. When the Washburn court
did not clearly identify the supporting spouse's interest as a property right, it
invited confusion and a lack of predictability at the trial court level. 124 As a
result, settlements are discouraged and the judicial system's reliability and
efficiency are needlessly impaired.
B. Valuation of the Interest
The Washburn decision is also flawed by its apparent alliance with the
line of cases that employs a restitution theory of valuing professional
degrees. Those cases grant out-of-pocket expenses and/or the cost of lost
opportunities to the supporting spouse, 125 but refuse to structure a mainte-
Washington prefers to reserve maintenance for short-term rehabilitative purposes. See, e.g., Berg v.
Berg, 72 Wn. 2d 532, 534, 434 P.2d 1, 3 (1967); Cleaver v. Cleaver, 10 Wn. App. 14, 20, 516 P.2d 508,
512 (1973); see also Family Law Reporter's 1983 Survey of American Family Law, 10 FAM. L. REP.
(BNA) 3017, 3019 (1984).
There is an appealing equity in awarding a supporting spouse an in-kind rehabilitative award for
purposes of advancing that spouse's own careergoals. See Washburn, 101 Wn. 2d at 180 n.4, 677 P.2d at
159 n.4; In re Marriage of Femau, 39 Wn. App. 695,705,694 P.2d 1092, 1099 (1984); Roberto v. Brown,
107 Wis. 2d 17, 318 N.W.2d 358 (1982). However, such an award should not eliminate the supporting
spouse's vested interest in the student spouse's professional degree. For example, ifa husband supported
his wife during ten years of medical training, but his career choice of architecture would require only five
years of training, her support of him during that period would not be adequate compensation. Thus, after
valuing the professional degree acquired during the marriage and assessing his proper interest, a court
could use his projected educational costs to offset his interest in the medical degree. For a discussion of
valuation methods, see infra notes 143-56 and accompanying text.
If a court makes the less preferred decision to identify the award as maintenance, the amount of
maintenance granted should be tied by means of a percentage escalation clause to the student spouse's
expected increase in ability to pay. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Fernau, 39 Wn. App. 695,698, 694 P.2d
1092, 1095 (1984). The use of escalation clauses in spousal maintenance awards has never been
expressly approved by the Washington appellate courts, although their use has been approved tacitly and
in dicta. See, e.g., Verde v. Verde, 78 Wn. 2d 206,471 P.2d 84 (1970); Jensen v. Jensen, 54 Wn. 2d 473,
341 P.2d 882 (1959); Berry v. Berry, 50 Wn. 2d 158, 163--64,310 P.2d 223,226 (1957); Dillon v. Dillon,
34 Wn. 2d 12, 207 P.2d 752 (1949). See generally Annot., 19 A.L.R.4th 830 (1983).
124. Lack of firm guidelines at the trial court level has been described as a problem in family law.
See R. EISLER, DISSOLUTION 17-18 (1977); White & Stone, A Study ofAlimony and Child Suport Rulings
with Some Recommendations, 10 FAM. L.Q. 75 (1976); Interview No. 702 by David Susskind, When
Divorce is Inevitable (aired on PBS Oct. 13, 1984) (attorney guests Marvin Mitchelson, William G.
Mulligan, Roy M. Cohn, Julia Perles, A. Robert Zeff) (video or audiotape available from Pamandia
Productions, 1350 Avenue of the Americas, MGM building, 28th floor, New York, N.Y. 10019, tel.
(212) 765-0505) (copy of notes from viewing on file with the Washington Law Review); see also Gelbart,
New Issues in Property Division, I WASH. ST. B.A. FAM. L. SEc. MID-YEAR MTG. & SEM. ch. 8, at 8-10
(1984).
125. Several courts describe such an award as "reimbursement alimony" See, e.g., Mahoney v.
Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982); Reiss v. Reiss, 195 N.J. Super. 150,478 A.2d 441 (1984).
But cf In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Iowa 1978) (affirming valuation based on
cost, which wife did not appeal; but other methods could have been used).
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nance or property award that considers the expectation interest of the
supporting spouse in the enhanced earning capacity of the student spouse.
1. The Opinion: Inappropriate Use of Restitution
The Washburn court left ambiguous the valuation issue, just as it did the
issue of identifying the nature of the interest. It is unclear whether the court
meant what it said, or whether it meant what it did. The court said that trial
courts must consider the earning potential of the student spouse in deter-
mining compensation to the supporting spouse. 126 Nevertheless, it affirmed
an award to Ms. Gillette in which that factor did not play .any part. 127 A
remand to the Gillette trial court for consideration of the student spouse's
earning potential would have been a better result.
Also, by reversing the one dollar maintenance award, the court limited
Ms. Gillette's recovery to restitution.128 Restitution is not an appropriate
means by which to fulfill the court's stated intention of allowing the
supporting spouse to share temporarily the lifestyle he or she helped the
student spouse to attain. 129
The goal of restitution is to return both parties to the positions they held
prior to entering into the transaction. 130 Restitution is an equitable remedy
that generally is applied to contracts that have been discharged due to
impossibility or frustration of purpose. 131 It is also applied to quasi-
contracts, contracts implied in law when the parties have made no explicit
agreement in advance of performance. 132
None of these situations is analogous to the joint acquisition of a
professional degree. The student spouse in fact received the degree and
obtained the enhanced earning capacity. Therefore, the contract's purpose
126. Washburn, 101 Wn. 2d at 180, 677 P.2d at 159; supra note 33 and accompanying text.
127. See Washburn, 101 Wn. 2d at 172-73, 677 P.2d at 155 (citing Conclusion of Law 4, Clerk's
Papers 75-76.) The trial court stated that $3200 of the award was based on Ms. Gillette's direct
contributions to the community during the educational period; that would correspond to the supreme
court's first factor. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. An additional $12,000 was based on the
wife's reduced living standards and reduced opportunity to accumulate property; that would correspond
to the court's second and third factors. Id. The remainder was for inflationary effects.
128. The award the trial court gave Ms. Gillette closely resembles the award in In re Marriage of
Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978). In Horstmann, the court made a property award based on the
amounts expended by the wife, and a one dollar maintenance award. Id. at 891-92. Applying an
investment analogy to such a remedy, the property award serves as a return of the wife's principal; the
maintenance, which can be modified as the husband's earnings increase, gives the wife the potential for
realizing a return on her principal.
129. See Washburn, 101 Wn. 2d at 179, 677 P.2d at 158.
130. J. CALAMARI & J. PEaa.o, THE LAw OF COmTRAcrs § 15-1 (2d ed. 1977).
131. Id.
132. 12 S. WmIuSrON, A TREAnsE ON THE LAw OF CoNTRAcrs § 1454 (W. Jaeger 3d ed. 1970 &
Supp. 1984).
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was not frustrated; fulfillment is still possible. Furthermore, an analogy to
quasi-contract is inappropriate since a mutually beneficial enterprise was
contemplated by both parties in advance of performance. In the Gillette
case, the husband explicitly promised his wife that she would never have to
work again after the degree was obtained. 133 An explicit promise is not
necessary, however, because the conduct of the parties is sufficient evidence
of their mutual intent to increase their family wealth. 134 Thus, restitution is
not an analytically appropriate remedy
Moreover, restitution is an inadequate remedy because it fails to recog-
nize the supporting spouse's expectation interest. 135 To the extent that the
current value of the degree exceeds its cost, restitution to the supporting
spouse is inadequate and unjust. 136
2. The Economic Partnership
Modem marriage is a partnership of coequals. 137 The labors of the
133. 101 Wn. 2d at 171, 677 P.2d at 154.
134. See infra notes 137-42 and accompanying text. Also, the presumption of community property
weighs against a conclusion that the benefits of their efforts should accrue only to the student spouse.
See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
135. One can posit, for example, a situation in which a restitution approach would result in no
recovery. Suppose a student husband received a full merit scholarship and a generous stipend. The
stipend plus income from a trust fund he owned separately equaled what he would have earned if he had
remained employed. The wife would have freely chosen to do the work she did at the school's location,
so no opportunity costs were incurred. Nonetheless, her assistance in editing his doctoral thesis and her
moral support were vital to his success during the difficult years of training. The divorce occurred the
day before graduation, and the next day he accepted a position at which he will earn an annual income
three times greater than the community's annual income during the period of education. Under a
restitution theory, she would receive nothing. But since the acquisition of the degree caused his earning
capacity to be significantly and suddenly enhanced after the marriage because of efforts during the
marriage, that enhanced earning capacity should be the measure of the value of the community's interest
in the professional degree.
136. See, e.g., Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 337 N.W.2d 332, 337 (1983);
Washburn, 101 Wn. 2d at 191, 677 P.2d at 165 (Rosellini, J., dissenting); Krauskopf, supra note 1, at
413-15.
One commentator succinctly described the injustice that results from a failure to properly assess
enhanced earning capacity: "Only by rewarding a share of the harvest-which in these cases is real,
bountiful, and capable of estimation-can the wife be fairly compensated. . . what court would repay
the farmer for many lost seasons of industry in successful harvests, by awarding him only the value of his
seeds?" Brigner, supra note 1, at 44.
A restitution award may be appropriate in the rare case where the divorce occurs within a year or two
after the educational period begins. Depending on the length of the total educational endeavor, the
supporting spouse's relatively brief investment might not have been a substantial factor in the attainment
of the advanced degree.
137. Equality of contribution and sharing is the cornerstone of the community property system.
Cross, supra note 59, at 733-34 & n.8. Also, a majority of family law commentators writing about both
community property and equitable distribution systems advocate this position. See, e.g., Bruch, supra
note 54, at 101 (1983); Foster & Freed, Marital Property and the Chancellor's Foot, 10 FANt. L.Q. 55,
452
The Treatment of a Professional Degree at Dissolution
spouses entitle each of them to manage 38 and share equitably 139 in the
proceeds of their mutual enterprises. When one spouse supports the other
during the acquisition of a professional education, the marital partners
demonstrate an intent to increase the general family wealth. The enhance-
ment of the student spouse's earning capacity as an individual, rather than as
137, 203 (1976); Krauskopf, Marital Property at Marriage Dissolution, 43 Mo. L. REv. 157, 158
(1978); Krauskopf & Thomas, Partnership Marriage: The Solution to an Ineffective and Inequitable
Lav of Support, 35 OHIo ST. L.J. 558 (1974); Prager, Sharing Principles and the Future of Marital
Property Law, 25 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1977); Weitzman, Changing Families, Changing Laws, 5 FAM.
ADVOC. 2, 7 (Summer 1982); Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62
CALF. L. REV. 1169, 1185 n.82 (1974); Note, The Implied Partnership: Equitable Alternative to
Contemporary Methods of Postmarital Property Distribution, 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 221, 226 (1974).
But see M. GLENDON, NEW PRoPERry, supra note 77, at 65-67 (partnership concept may be
meaningful in ongoing marriage but should not apply at time of divorce); G. GILDER, SEXUAL SUICIDE
95-109 (1973) (preserving male domination and female dependence in economic matters best promotes
stability of families and society; female careerism is costly to society because women will not be
creating and maintaining families and thereby socializing men); Glendon, Is There a Future for
Separate Property?, 8 FAM. L.Q. 315, 327 (1974) (individualistic values may eventually outweigh the
community aspect of marriage, leading to an emphasis on separate property laws rather than a marital
partnership model); Oldham, Is the Concept of Marital Property Outdated?, 22 J. FAm. L. 263, 268,
286, 288 (1984) (with a few exceptions, marriages are not "true partnerships" until a child is born or
until couple has been married at least five years, since sharing principles do not govern decisions in a
short, childless marriage).
As to Professor Oldham's thesis, it would clearly be poor social policy to put pressure on a newlywed
woman to have a child as soon as possible after the marriage, if she had no other way to "secure" her
claim to any shared marital property. She might thereby delay developing her own career potential, and
then, should the marriage fail, her fall into the dizzying spiral of poverty experienced by female-headed
families would only be exacerbated. Moreover, a couple's emotional and financial decision to have a
child should be subject only to the highest motivations, rather than being muddied by an added factor
that would profoundly alter the financial relationship between the spouses. In any event, it should be
noted that Oldham acknowledged that "when one spouse supports the other through professional
school" an equitable award should be made. Id. at 283.
138. See WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.030 (1983); Cross, supra note 59, at 782.
The premise of the common law system, in contrast, was that a married couple was a unit, controlled
by the husband. "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or
legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and
consolidated into that of the husband; under whose wing, protection, and cover she performs every
thing .... " 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442 (emphasis omitted).
139. For a discussion of community property principles, see supra notes 59, 91-95 and accompany-
ing text. For a philosophical discussion of the labor theory of property acquisition, see L. BECKER,
PROERT RiGrrrs 32-56, 100-01 (1977).
The egalitarian concept of shared responsibilities and rights within the family unit has arrived in the
popular culture and will not be dislodged. See generally Here Come the Baby Boomers, U.S. NEWs &
WORLD REP. 68 (Nov. 5, 1984) (discussion of "fundahmental changes" in attitudes toward marriage and
sex roles toward more egalitarianism); Meislin, Poll Finds More Liberal Beliefs on Marriage and Sex
Roles, Especially Among the Young, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27,1977, at 75, col. 1 (only 27% of respondents
aged 18 to 29 preferred traditional roles, as opposed to 59% of respondents over age 45), noted in
Weitzman, Changing Families, Changing Laws, 5 FAm. ADvoc. 2, 7 (Summer 1982). Decisions as to
how family members' resources will be expended are now typically made jointly, with an express or
implied intent to do that which will yield the greatest social, economic and psychological benefits to all
members of the family. See Krauskopf, supra note 1, at 386-88.
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a family member, is secondary.140 It would be unjust to describe the
supporting spouse's services as gifts or labors of love, 141 since that which is
produced by the community should be shared by the community. Taking
into account the intent of the parties, the just result is to award to the
supporting spouse an expectation interest, that is, a share of the current
value of the investment in the student spouse's human capital. 142
IV. A VALUATION PROPOSAL: MODIFIED EXPECTATION
AWARD
Valuation of the supporting spouse's interest in the enhanced earning
capacity may be difficult or may involve some speculation. This does not
justify, however, denying the supporting spouse an appropriate remedy 143 A
140. See Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258,337 N.W.2d 332,334 (1983). The more
typical choice to invest in the husband's education shows a recognition that an investment in his human
capital is likely to be more lucrative. For a discussion of the gap between men's and women's earnings.
see supra note 111.
141. See Foster& Freed, SpousalRights in Retirement and Pension Benefits, 16 J. FAM. L. 187, 187
(1978); Krauskopf, supra note 1, at 394.
Some courts have implied that this economic model of marriage demeans the devoted, giving, love
relationship that marriage also represents in our culture. See, e.g., DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 296
N.W.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1980) (superceded by statute as stated in In re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d
1, 318 N.W.2d 918, 922 (1982)). In DeWitt, the court held that the cost approach valuation of a degree
was inappropriate because "[i]t treats the parties as though they were strictly business partners, one of
whom has made a calculated investment in the commodity of the other's professional training, expecting
a dollar for dollar return. We do not think that most marital planning is so coldly undertaken." 98 Wis.
2d at 57, 296 N.W.2d at 767.
To see marriage in this light, as one of life's highest moral and ethical commitments, is admirable in a
non-legal setting. However, to carry those attitudes into the dissolution context is to tread a line
dangerously close to the attitudes that underlay fault-based litigation, with its "unholy quadriga of
collusion, condonation, connivance and recrimination." Rieke, supra note 41, at 387-88. As Professor
Shultz observed, "[I]ove does not exclude accountability or consequences. Obligation is inextricably
interwoven with voluntariness. Intimacy can coexist with planning and choice; indeed today it must."
Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 204, 210
(1982).
142. For an original and sophisticated analysis of this point, see Krauskopf, supra note 1, at
381-82, 388-95. Professor Krauskopf draws interesting analogies to investments by managers in the
careers of sports and entertainment figures. See also Weitzman, supra note 77, at 1210-12.
143. See Sullivan v. Sullivan, 134 Cal. App. 3d 634,184 Cal. Rptr. 796, 814 (1982) ("The difficulty
of determining the value of an economic interest in a [professional degree] is not a proper basis upon
which to deny the existence of such an interest.") (Ziebarth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part), rev'd, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984); Washburn, 101 Wn. 2d at 187, 677
P.2d at 163 (Rosellini, L, dissenting) (Courts "rarely deny a remedy for lost future earning capacity" in
personal injury actions merely because "some speculation" is involved. "We should be equally hesitant
to deny relief to a nonstudent spouse who has lost the economic potential of the partial value of the
education that she helped to provide. ") (citing Peck & Hopkins, Economics and Impaired Earning
Capacity in Personal Injury Cases, 44 WASH. L. REv. 351 (1969)). See also In re Marriage of Fleege, 91
Wn. 2d 324, 330, 588 P.2d 1136, 1140 (1979) (even though value of goodwill cannot be precisely
determined, court should not be deterred from assigning it a reasonable value); In re Marriage of
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number of workable solutions have been proposed, each based on cap-
italization of future earnings. 144 Trial courts can adapt various formulas to
the particular circumstances of each case to reach ajust and equitable result.
The key element of any valuation method is that it should be prospective
rather than retrospective. 145 As with goodwill, the professional degree may
be valued at what it is expected to generate in future dollars. 146 That
expectation should be modified, however, by the understanding that since
the marriage has ended, neither spouse will receive the full benefit of his or
her investment in the community assets. If the professional has begun
practicing, an actual earnings base will exist upon which projections can be
made. 147 A body of economic and actuarial knowledge exists to adjust for
factors such as market trends, conditions within a particular geographical
area, or the desire to develop a particular specialty. 148
The more difficult problem is to determine the portion of the projected
future earnings that is attributable to the community's efforts during the
Lukens, 16 Wn. App. 481, 486, 558 P.2d 279, 282 (1976) ("fact that professional goodwill may be
elusive, intangible, and difficult to evaluate is not a proper reason to ignore its existence ....
review denied, 88 Wn. 2d 1011 (1977).
Valuation methods for intangible assets in dissolution law will evolve and mature as economic and
legal theory develops, just as methods for valuing damages have evolved in tort law. See Peck &
Hopkins, supra note 65, at 352-56.
144. See Fitzpatrick & Doucette, supra note 69 (capitalized present value of enhanced earning
capacity, pro-rated by a fraction in which the numerator is the years of marriage during education and the
denominator is the total years of education); Rosen & Burke, supra note 65 (capitalized present value of
enhanced earning capacity, pro-rated); Schaefer, Wife Works Hard So Husband Can Go to Law School:
Should She Be Taken In as a "Partner" when "Esq." is Followed by Divorce?, 2 COMM. PROP. J. 85,
93-97 (1975), reprinting as revised Comment, The Interest of the Community in a Professional
Education, 10 CAL. W.L. REv. 590, 604-12 (1974) (capitalized present value of enhanced earning
capacity, multiplied by "sliding fraction" to adjust for value of experience acquired after education).
Contra Moore, Should a ProfessionalDegree Be Considered a MaritalAsset Upon Divorce?, 15 AKRON
L. REv. 543,554-55 (1982) (degree is an asset, but capitalization of future earnings is too speculative).
Compare discussion of escalator clause awards, supra note 123.
145. See Schaefer, supra note 144, at 93 & nn-78-79 (value is a prospective concept, based on the
potential earning power that an entity possesses). Restitution is inappropriate because it is retrospective.
See supra notes 126-36 and accompanying text.
146. Goodwill has been defined as the expectation of continued patronage. In re Marriage of
Fleege, 91 Wn. 2d 324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979). For goodwill valuation methods, see In re Marriage of
Hall, 103 Wn. 2d 236, 243-45, 692 P.2d 175, 179-80 (1984) (five valuation methods described); In re
Marriage of Freedman, 35 Wn. App. 49, 52, 665 P.2d 902, 905 (1983) (goodwill can be valued as a
percentage of the income of the professional spouse, although it is an asset distinct from those separate
earnings), review denied, 100 Wn. 2d 1019 (1983).
147. In Washburn, for example, both husbands had established an actual earnings history as
professionals at the time of trial. Mr. Washburn had completed one year as a post-graduate intern and two
years in practice. Mr. Gillette had completed nearly a year in practice. See supra notes 16-17 and
accompanying text.
148. Peck & Hopkins, supra note 65, at 355-56, 358; Rosen & Burke, supra note 65, at 25. The
Gillette trial court, for example, admitted economic evidence of the average earnings of a veterinarian in
a two-man clinic with a large animal practice in the Pacific Northwest. Brief of Respondent Alice June
Gillette, supra note 48, at 10.
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period of professional education. First, only the enhanced earning capacity
should be considered; that is, one should determine the difference between
what the student spouse would have made without the degree and that
spouse's projected future earnings with the degree. Second, deductions
should be made for significant post-divorce sources of future earnings, such
as learning experiences at work or in continuing education programs, and
the devotion, skill, and business acumen with which the professional builds
a practice. 149 On the other hand, the professional degree is a prerequisite to
the exercise of such income-enhancing opportunities and abilities, so the
degree should be given substantial weight. The question then becomes at
what rate a professional education depreciates. 150 This seems to be an
imponderable, and would vary widely among individuals and among pro-
fessions. 151
A. Valuation of the Enhanced Earning Capacity
This uncertainty can be avoided by an alternative approach to valuation.
Courts could return the supporting spouse's investment on a year-for-year
basis. Granting a year of return for every year of support makes it unneces-
sary to speculate as to the portion of the enhanced earning capacity's value
in which a community interest exists. Under this proposal, the supporting
spouse's interest in the enhanced earning capacity would extend into the
professional's career for the same number of years that it took to acquire the
degree. 152 During the early years of the professional's career, however, the
earnings will be relatively low. The community's investment in the degree
will not have begun to pay out at its average rate of return. The following
formula takes that factor into account.
149. It is these post-divorce sources of the professional's earnings that are really being referred to
when courts confronted with this issue say they will not put a lien on future earnings. For further
discussion on that point, see supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
150. Only one commentator has ventured a formula. See Schaefer, supra note 144, at 95-97.
Schaefer proposes the use of a "sliding fraction" multiplier in which the numerator would be the total
years of professional education and the denominator would be the number of years since the professional
education was commenced. For example, the portion of a lawyer's first-year salary attributable to the
lawyer's education would be 3/4; the portion of the second-year salary would be 3/5; etc.
Schaefer's formula is creative and has attracted much interest among commentators, but Schaefer
admits that it is speculative, id. at 97, and it is criticized for that reason. See, e.g., Note, Horstmann v.
Horstmann: Present Right to Practice a Profession as Marital Property, 56 DEN. L.J. 677, 690 n.73
(1979). The author has found no court opinion that employed Schaefer's formula, although one court
noted that it might be helpful to trial courts. Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 337
N.W.2d 332, 337 n.8 (1983).
151. These are difficult questions, but the element of speculation does not outweigh the importance
of recognizing and assigning a value to the supporting spouse's property interest in the enhanced earning
capacity. Every valuation involves a certain amount of speculation.
152. At least one court has endorsed such an approach, referring to it as a variation of the labor
theory of value. Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796, 803 (1984).
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The valuation approach proposed here can be best illustrated by referring
to the Washburns' situation. First, Mr. Washburn's projected lifetime earn-
ings should be capitalized at present value. Then, that figure should be
divided by the number of years remaining in his work-life expectancy. This
would result in the present value of the average annual salary for his
professional work-life. A similar calculation should be made to obtain the
present value of his average annual income as it would have been without
the professional degree. 153 Next, the difference between those two average
annual incomes should be multiplied by the five years of Ms. Washburn's
investment in her husband's professional training. 154
Thus, if the present value of Mr. Washburn's average annual income as a
veterinarian were $35,000, and the present value of his average annual
income without veterinary training were $20,000, the calculation would be:
($35,000-$20,000) x 5.0 years = $75,000
difference between period value of property
average annual income x of education = subject to
with and without during marriage equitable
professional degree distribution
The community would have an interest in $75,000 of Mr. Washburn's
enhanced earning capacity. It would then be left to the trial court's discretion
to award Ms. Washburn an equitable share of that amount. 155
B. Deduction for Consumption
If the marriage endured for some time after the education was completed,
it is likely that the community would have already received a benefit from its
investment, or that the supporting spouse can be at least partially compen-
sated with an award of tangible assets.156 The community's interest in the
153. This figure would be relatively easy to calculate for college graduates who worked for some
time before returning to professional school. In the case of the student whose post-secondary education
was not interrupted by a period of employment, actuarial knowledge exists to project typical lifetime
earnings for college graduates. See Fitzpatrick & Doucette, supra note 69, at 518-19; Rosen & Burke,
supra note 65, at 26; Schaefer, supra note 144, at 93-94.
154. It appears from the facts as given in the opinion that the period was two or three months short of
five years, including time spent as an intern. See Washburn, 101 Wn. 2d at 170-71,677 P.2d at 154; supra
note 16 and accompanying text. It will be assumed for the sake of this illustration to be exactly five years.
A question courts should review on a case-by-case basis is whether a period of paid internship should
be included in the period of education. If the internship is required in order to practice the profession,
and the difference between the intern's salary and what a practicing professional earns is significant, it
should probably be included as education time.
155. For a discussion of how that discretion is exercised in Washington, see supra note 122.
156. Washburn, 101 Wn. 2d at 181, 677 P.2d at 159. See, e.g., Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333,631
P.2d 115, 123 (1981); Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 135 (1969); Watling v.
Watling, 127 Mich. App. 624, 339 N.W.2d 505 (1983).
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professional degree should still be assigned a value, but an amount repre-
senting consumption during the post-education period should be deducted
from that value.
This could be calculated in at least two ways. The simplest method would
be to offset a year of consumption with a year of investment. In the above
example, then, if Mr. and Ms. Washburn had enjoyed two years of a higher
standard of living after his education, the multiplier would be three instead
of five, and the value of property subject to distribution would be $45,000.
The weakness of this method is that it incorrectly assumes that during the
early years of practice, the salary will be as great as the average annual
salary over the professional's work-life, and that the opportunities for
consumption will be as great per year as they will be when he actually
attains that average annual salary.
A more accurate alternative for most cases would be to calculate the
actual increased consumption opportunities of the community in the post-
education period. For example, if Mr. Washburn's post-education salary
were $25,000 per year, he would contribute $10,000 more to the community
over a two-year period than he would have been able to contribute prior to
earning the degree. If all of that added buying power were consumed by the
community, then the property subject to distribution would be reduced from
$75,000 to $65,000. Even if only a portion of the $10,000 were consumed,
however, the deduction should be the same, since the remaining assets will
appear in the community's accounting and be subject to equitable distribu-
tion in another form.
The weakness in this second method is that it relies on a comparison of
the actual post-education salary with the projected value of the average
annual income without the degree. It is impossible to know if the student
spouse would have attained that average income at the same relative point in
time. Until the professional reaches the mid-point of the salary cycle,
however, this method is likely to be the better alternative.
C. Judicial Resolution
After a value is placed on the enhanced earning capacity, and a reduction
for consumption, if appropriate, is made, the court will be in a position to
make an equitable distribution of all the property. 157 In most cases the
student spouse will not yet have accumulated sufficient property to pay the
award. Thus, the court can order that it be paid in installments or that
payment be deferred for a period of time. 158 Also, the court can order that
157. See supra note 122.
158. See, e.g., DeRuwe v. DeRuwe, 72 Wn. 2d 404, 433 P.2d 209 (1967); 1. BAXTER, supra note
75, § 41:7(a) at 182.
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the payments be protected by the purchase of a declining term life insurance
policy.159 An effective alternative is to order the purchase of an annuity, if
there are sufficient liquid assets to do so.
V. CONCLUSION
The professional degree is one example of the work-related assets that are
becoming the primary forms of wealth in society. The Washburn court failed
to identify the essential nature of a professional degree as property. The
decision thus gives little guidance to trial court judges, who must know
what constitutes property subject to distribution in order to structure the
dissolution decree properly. A clear distinction between property and
maintenance is also important to practitioners and parties, who need to
know how to enforce their awards, whether the obligations created are
dischargeable in bankruptcy, and what their tax responsibilities will be.
If the supporting spouse is a woman, she typically will not have the same
access to wealth through employment as that of her former husband. Courts
must recognize this social reality when they consider the future earning
prospects of each spouse, as the Washburn court directed them to do. 160
Although it is not appropriate to evaluate enhanced earning capacity in all
marital dissolutions, it is appropriate when a professional degree is
acquired by the joint efforts of the marital partners. Fairness requires that
the fruits of their labor be shared. To award restitution or no recovery is to
promote injustice, since it denies the supporting spouse access to wealth
that he or she helped to produce. The supporting spouse's investment of
labor and funds deserves to be compensated by an award based on expecta-
tion. The valuation method proposed here would provide for such an
expectation award, while limiting the recovery to a year of return for every
year of support.
Helen A. Boyer
159. E.g., Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 337 N.W.2d 332, 337-38 (1983);
O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d 233,452 N.Y.S.2d 801, 806 (1982); In re Marriage of Donovan, 25
Wn. App. 691, 698-99, 612 P.2d 387, 391 (1980). It is possible to structure life insurance policies that
are tied to a specified term and amount of obligation. The cost would not be prohibitive.
160. 101 Wn. 2d at 180, 677 P.2d at 159.
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